Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

I
ncentives to donate to charity have existed in the tax code almost as long as the income tax itself. The most wellknown incentive reduces the cost of charitable contributions by allowing those taxpayers who itemize expenses to deduct contributions from taxable income. By making contributions, taxpayers can also reduce their net wealth, lowering their potential estate tax burden. Similarly, the deductibility of charitable bequests from the value of estates subject to the estate tax provides an additional incentive to leave charitable bequests.
The purpose of this article is to review the current levels, sources, and recipients of donations, the basic mechanisms of these incentives, and the estimated magnitude of the response to tax incentives. Rather than comprehensively examining the existing literature, we focus on a few representative estimates, in some cases augmenting them with new results from 1997 and 1998 data. Finally, we discuss the possible effects on charitable giving of some recent tax proposals.
LEVELS, SOURCES, AND RECIPIENTS OF CHARITABLE GIVING
Charitable giving reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1997 amounted to over $120 billion, about 1.5 percent of GDP. Giving USA reported charitable giving in 1997 of $153.77 billion (about 2 percent of GDP), which includes giving by foundations and non-itemizing individuals; these figures are not obtainable from tax returns.
Total charitable giving may differ from that reported to the IRS for several reasons. First, only individuals that itemize deductions on their income tax returns report their contribu-tions to the IRS. However, individuals who itemize may overstate their contributions.
1 Finally, charitable bequests are only reported to the IRS by the approximately 4 percent of decedents with estates that exceed the filing threshold for estate tax returns. Hence, total bequests may be larger than reported to the IRS.
Of the charitable donations reported to the IRS in 1997, about 93 percent came from individuals and estates and about 7 percent from corporations. Charitable donations during life are referred to here as individual contributions, and comprised about 84 percent of total charitable giving reported to the IRS during 1997. Charitable donations at the time of death are typically called charitable bequests; in 1997, such bequests comprised about 9 percent of total charitable giving reported to the IRS. Figure 1 shows that while the total amount reported to the IRS has grown between 1985 and 1997, the proportions from corporations, individual contributions, and individual bequests remained fairly stable.
Giving USA estimates total charitable giving to be $174.35 billion in 1998, significantly more than that reported on tax returns. This is composed of individual contributions of $134 billion (77 percent of total giving), bequests of $13.6 billion (7.8 percent), corporate giving of $9.7 billion (5.5 percent) and giving by foundations of $17 billion (9.8 percent). These data indicate that annual contributions by individuals exceeded those reported to the IRS by about $25 billion (or 1 Slemrod (1989) analyzed data on intensive audits of selected 1982 tax returns and reported that post-audit adjustments reduced reported contributions by an average of 7.2 percent. This may overstate the actual adjustments, since the auditor-adjusted contributions may not represent actual contributions. The auditors, for example, may have disallowed contributions that were actually made because of inadequate documentation.
Findings from 1982 tax returns may not be applicable to data from the 1990s because 1982 law allowed limited deductions of charitable contributions of non-itemizers. 
Contributions deflated by Consumer Price Index (1997 = 100)
Source: Statistics of Income 19 percent of such contributions). However, the Giving USA data appear to indicate a lower level of charitable bequests than was reported to the IRS (Kaplan, 2000) .
Here we estimate total individual contributions by using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data and supplementing it with Statistics of Income (SOI) data and Consumer Expenditure (CEX) data. The CEX provides information on contributions less than $500, the lower limit available in the SCF. Although the CEX lacks information on giving to all types of recipients, it contains data on cash contributions to the four types of charities receiving the most contributions. Information from the SOI about the contributions of the 400 taxpayers with the highest adjusted gross incomes are used as a proxy for the Forbes 400, which are excluded from the SCF. Combining contributions from these three sources yields an estimate of $116 billion in charitable contributions in 1997.
High-income individuals are more likely to report making charitable contributions and to give a disproportionate amount of their income. SCF data indicate that the 0.2 percent of households with income greater than $1 million made about 10.5 percent of annual charitable contributions in 1997, despite having 8.4 percent of all household income (See Table  1 ). Similarly, the 7.8 percent of households with income over $100,000 made over 45 percent of annual charitable contributions, despite having 37 percent of household income.
Lower-income households appear to contribute smaller average percentages of their income to charity and are less likely to donate. Among the group of households that contribute to charities, however, households with income under $25,000 contribute a larger percentage of their income (about 1.5 percent of income) than do households with incomes between $25,000 and $50,000 2 (see Figure 2 ). Above that level, average charitable contributions as a percent of income tend to increase, reaching a peak of about 3 percent of income for households with incomes above $400,000. This pattern of charitable contributions as a percentage of income being relatively high for lower income households who contribute, declining slightly for middle-income households who contribute, and rising again as income increases generates a u-shape, a pattern observed in Clotfelter (1985) and Havens and Schervish (1999) . The latter article finds that the high percentage of contributions among low-income house holds is due primarily to their contributions to religious organizations.
In fact, most individual contributions are made to religious organizations. Independent Sector provides a breakdown of contributions in 1998 by type of nonprofit organization, shown here in Figure 3 . Households gave about 60 percent of their annual contributions to religious organizations. Human services accounted for 9 percent of annual charitable contributions, health and education about 6.5 percent each, and the arts only 3.3 percent. Higher income individuals tend to give a greater proportion to health and education while lower income individuals tend to give more to religion.
In Table 2 the wealthy appear to contribute less than would be expected solely on the basis of their wealth holdings. The 1998 SCF data indicate that 10.6 percent of the population had wealth over $750,000 in 1998. Those households owned 59.4 percent of household wealth but made 53.1 percent of annual charitable contributions. However, the most wealthy (those with wealth over $40 million) made a disproportionately large share of contributions-they made 7.5 percent of contributions but owned 4.7 percent of wealth.
The very wealthy also bequeath a significantly larger percentage of their assets to charity than decedents with estates under $10 million (see Table 3 ). As gross estates increase, decedents are more likely to make charitable bequests and those making bequests give a larger percentage of their estates. Among 1999 filers, the 0.2 percent of filing decedents with gross estates over $40 million made almost 40 percent of charitable bequests but owned only 11.5 percent of the assets of all filers. About 56 percent of decedents with estates of that size made charitable bequests, and those bequests averaged almost 32 percent of the gross estate. On average, decedents with gross estates under $10 million give less to charity than would be indicated by their assets. For example, about 23 percent of decedents with gross estates between $5 million and $10 million made charitable bequests, and those bequests averaged about 21 percent of the value of the gross estates.
Overall, over 46 percent of dollars reported bequeathed to charity were given to foundations, 28 percent to education/ medical organizations, about 10 percent each to religious and 'other' charities, 4 percent to the arts, and 1 percent to social welfare charities (see Figure 4) . It is difficult to know the purpose of the foundations receiving those bequests, but some insight may be gained from information reported by the Foundation Center about the types of organizations that received grants from existing corporate and noncorporate foundations in 1998 3 (see Figure 5) . Comparing this allocation to charitable bequests, we see that a larger proportion of nonfoundation bequests goes to education and religion. The pattern of bequests also varies depending upon the size of the taxable estate. Figures 6 and 7 describe the distribution for estates below and above $4.2 million, respectively. The percent of bequests allocated to religious organizations is much larger in the former than the latter, but the percent of contributions to education, health and science is relatively smaller. To the extent that foundations tend to support education, health and science organizations and not religious institutions, the difference in the actual patterns of bequests is even greater than it appears here.
TAX INCENTIVES FOR CHARITABLE GIVING
The public goods nature of giving may cause people to donate less than the optimal amount. If so, then interventions that increase giving can increase the well-being of society as a whole. The federal government intervenes to increase charitable giving by providing funding to charities, providing similar services itself, and using the tax code to subsidize charitable giving by individuals.
Individual Income Tax
A taxpayer who itemizes deductions generally is allowed to deduct contributions to charities when computing taxable income. The resulting tax price of contributing a dollar is 1 -t, where t is the marginal tax rate. The allowed amount of charitable deductions may vary depending on several factors such as: a) the type of property contributed (contributions may include cash, appreciated assets, property, and certain volunteer expenses), b) the income of the taxpayer, and c) the type of charitable organization receiving the contribution.
Cash contributions are deductible as long as the donor does not receive an economic benefit from the charity. If the taxpayer receives an economic benefit as a result of the contribution, the contribution can be deducted only to the extent that the amount contributed exceeds the fair market value of any benefit received.
The deductible amount of a charitable contribution of appreciated property depends on whether it is ordinary income property or capital gain property. Property that would give rise to ordinary income or short-term capital gains if sold at its fair market value on the date it was contributed is ordinary income property. The deduction for charitable contributions of such property is limited to the fair market value of the property less the amount that would be ordinary income. Capital gain property includes assets on which a long-term capital gain would have been realized if the taxpayer had sold the asset at its fair market value on the date of contribution. This property frequently includes appreciated stock. Charitable gifts of such property are generally deductible at the fair market value on the date of contribution.
Volunteer effort is not directly subsidized, except to the extent that costs (such as the cost of transportation) are deductible. This inequality between contributions of cash and time discourages volunteer work in favor of cash contributions. Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz (1996) and Greene and McClelland (2001) find that volunteer effort and cash contributions are complements, so that a change in the incentive to make contributions would also affect volunteer labor.
The tax code partially limits deductions by high income taxpayers or taxpayers making unusually large contributions as a percent of their income. First, cash contributions may be deducted only to the extent that they do not exceed fifty percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income (AGI) for the taxable year. Contributions in excess of the 50 percent limit may be carried over and deducted over the next five taxable years, as long as the deduction does not exceed the relevant percentage limitations. Long-term capital gains are also subject to a 50 percent limit if the taxpayer deducts the basis of the property but a 30 percent limit if a taxpayer deducts the market value. Long-term capital gain property contributed to a private foundation is subject to a 20 percent limit and only the basis may be deducted unless the property is publicly traded stock.
For taxpayers with AGI above a threshold amount (indexed for inflation), federal law reduces some itemized deductions, including charitable contributions. In 2001 the threshold AGI amount is $132,950 ($66,475 for married taxpayers filing separately). Deductions subject to this limit are reduced by 3 percent of AGI over the threshold limit. As described in Joint Committee on Taxation (2001a) the tax incentive provided by the deduction is not affected by the 3 percent reduction. They illustrate this in a simple equation where tax burden T equals: 
In this case a one dollar increase in contributions reduces taxes by (0.2)t. The tax price is therefore 1 -(0.2)t and a taxpayer in the 36 percent bracket would face a tax price of 0.928 rather than 0.64. This largely eliminates the tax incentive to contribute.
Although the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) may still deduct contributions and so does not eliminate the tax incentive to contribute, the AMT has indirect effects on contributions. First, because disposable income is lower than it otherwise would be, the demand for normal goods, such as charitable contributions, will decrease. Secondly, the statutory marginal rates of the AMT are 26 and 28 percent. For those taxpayers whose marginal tax rates would otherwise be higher these rates represent an increase in the tax price.
More noteworthy than the direct incentive is the complexity of the AMT that creates uncertainty about whether it applies to any given taxpayer. JCT (2001b) states that there are five tax preference items that increase AMT income and 11 separate adjustments to taxable income. Rebelein and Tempalski (2000) note that several tax forms and tax credit forms instruct filers to fill out a 12 line worksheet to determine if the filer might be subject to the AMT. At this point, some taxpayers are further directed to fill out another 50 line form to determine whether or not they are actually subject to the AMT. Given the complexity of tax law for those potentially subject to the regular income tax deduction, the AMT, and the various phaseouts, it is worth considering whether some taxpayers respond to the exact tax price they will ultimately face, just the fact that charitable contributions are deductible, or fail to consider the individual income tax system at all when making contributions.
Estate and Gift Tax
Taxpayers subject to the estate and gift tax can deduct a charitable bequest from the value of their estate when calculating the taxable estate, providing an incentive to leave charitable bequests. The tax also provides individuals with an incentive to make charitable contributions during life, because such contributions reduce wealth, the taxable estate, and ultimately, the final estate and gift tax liability. Hence, both charitable bequests and charitable contributions during life can reduce a taxpayer's ultimate estate tax liability. Boskin (1976) describes this incentive by using the price of leaving a bequest to heirs:
where d is the discount rate, r is the real growth rate of the asset, and e is the marginal estate tax rate faced at death. If the discount rate equals the real growth rate of the asset, then the price of leaving a bequest to heirs equals 1/(1 -e i ). For example, if the marginal rate is 50 percent then the price of leaving an extra dollar to heirs is two: one dollar goes to the heir and the other is paid in taxes. Individuals therefore have an incentive to consume or give away assets during life. Under the estate and gift tax, individuals face tax rates ranging from 37 to 55 percent on the taxable value of estates exceeding a certain level. Tax law provides a credit that until 1997 effectively exempted the first $600,000 of an estate from estate and gift taxation. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA-97) will gradually raise that effective exemption to $1 million by 2006, with the filing limit for those dying in 2000 and 2001 at $675,000. TRA-97 also provided special exemptions for transfers of family-owned businesses, which effectively generate an immediate $1.3 million exemption.
About 4 percent of 1998 decedents were required to file estate tax returns. Largely as a result of the spousal exemption, in 1997 only 48 percent of the estate tax returns that were filed faced a positive estate and gift tax liability.
Estate and gift tax law also provides an unlimited spousal exemption-a decedent may bequeath an unlimited amount to a spouse free of estate and gift taxation, although when the surviving spouse dies the estate is subject to estate and gift taxation. With minimally competent estate planning, a married couple can take advantage of the spousal exemption to exempt twice the effective exemption amount from estate taxation.
Corporate Income Tax
A corporation may deduct charitable contributions up to 10 percent of the corporation's modified taxable income for the year. A charitable contribution that is not currently deductible because of the percentage limitation may be carried over for up to five taxable years.
HOW CHARITABLE GIVING RESPONDS TO TAX INCENTIVES
One benchmark for viewing the responsiveness of charitable giving to tax incentives is whether or not the additional donations induced by the itemized deduction exceed the amount lost to the Treasury. If they do, then the deduction is "treasury efficient." For a given level of charitable giving, C, the Treasury loses (t)C, so that the deduction is efficient if:
[4]
If we note that dC/dt = -dC/d(1 -t) and rearrange, [5] In other words, the deduction is treasury efficient if the tax price elasticity exceeds one in absolute value.
Prior to 1989 a large body of research supported a price elasticity of about -1.2 for individual contributions. For example, Clotfelter (1987) lists nine separate studies with elasticities in the range of -1.1 to -1.4. The main exceptions use the 1973 National Survey of Philanthropy and find elasticities between -2.1 and -2.5. The deduction for contributions would appear, then, to be treasury efficient.
However, many of these studies use cross-sectional tax data and omit important variables such as wealth and education. Broman (1989) addresses the omission possibility by using a first-difference model on panel data from 1981 and 1982. Her results imply that unobserved heterogeneity led to substantial overestimates of the price elasticity in previous
studies. 4 More recently, Randolph (1995) decomposed the price and income elasticities into permanent and transitory components.
By drawing on a 10-year panel of taxpayers, Randolph was able to use the method of Burman and Randolph (1994) to create measures of permanent income and the permanent tax price. Essentially, this is a two-stage least squares method using instruments that are correlated with the permanent components of after-tax income and the tax price but that are uncorrelated with transitory components. His estimate of the permanent tax price elasticity is only -0.51 and insignificantly different from zero, while the transitory price elasticity is -1.55. In a simple regression in which the permanent components are excluded he found a price elasticity of -1.21. This suggests that while some taxpayers are timing their contributions to take advantage of changes in tax law or transitory variations in tax rates caused by highly variable income, the permanent effect is rather small. He estimates a permanent income elasticity of 1.14 and a transitory income elasticity of 0.58.
Articles such as Barrett, McGuirk, and Steinberg (1997) and Bradley, Holden, and McClelland (2000) find similar results. The former used a panel of taxpayers and found a long-run price elasticity of -0.47, while the latter used a measure of permanent income in the 1982-84 Consumer Expenditure Survey and found a long-run price elasticity of -0.78. However, when contributions are limited to social welfare organizations, Bradley, Holden, and McClelland (2000) find an elasticity of -1.34. The elasticity of the omitted contributions, mostly religious giving, must then be extremely low.
In this article we estimate the effects of permanent and transitory components of income on contributions of families in the 1998 SCF with the following equation: was created using the marginal tax rate estimated from the income in question X7362. Current income was derived from X5729 and the current tax price P I i was calculated from this income. For the remaining three-quarters of families, both permanent and current income are derived from X5729 after subtracting the appropriate federal taxes. Because these data are taken from a single year, our estimates should be interpreted as the response to permanent and transitory income and may not reflect permanent and transitory tax prices. The appendix further describes the data and regression methodology.
The results are given in Table 4 . The elasticity of giving with respect to a proportional change in current and permanent income (β 4 ) is 0.46. This is considerably lower than 0.78, which Clotfelter (1990) describes as representative. Many studies, however, omit wealth measures. The low estimate may be due to either the effect of permanent income or due to the inclusion of wealth. If our model is re-estimated without the wealth and bequest price variables the income elasticity increases to 0.72, suggesting that income elasticities in the 0.80 range derived from equations omitting a wealth variable may be too high. The elasticity with respect to transitory income (β 3 ), however, is only 0.23. This implies that households are less willing to contribute out of transitory gains in income than out of permanent gains.
The permanent income elasticity here is much lower than that of Randolph (1995) . One possible explanation is that our model omits variables that are negatively correlated with permanent income but positively correlated with contributions, biasing our estimate towards zero.
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Another possibility is that Randolph's instrument for permanent income, the logarithm of the 10-year average of pre-tax income, may not be highly correlated with an individual's expectations of their permanent income.
As indicated in Table 4 , the estate tax also appears to affect contributions. The bequest tax price elasticity of the estate tax of 0.60 is similar to the estimate of 0.54 in Greene and McClelland (2001) and the range of estimates of 0.59 to 0.78 found in Auten and Joulfaian (1996) . The former paper focused on the contributions of families with a head of household between 50 and 60 years of age while the latter focused on the contributions of individuals in the year before death. The wealth elasticity is 0.37, approximately the same as in Auten and Joulfaian (1996) , but substantially higher than in Greene and McClelland (2001) , and Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) .
Unlike Greene and McClelland (2001) , we assume here that families estimate their estate tax burden as being the one due were they to die in the current year. In our previous paper we supplemented this case with three growth scenarios intended to represent different beliefs individuals may have about the growth pattern of their assets. As described in the appendix, these estimates are for families with net worth below $4.2 million. For net worth below this point marital status and the specific composition of wealth provide variation in the bequest tax price independent of net worth. Above that point the 55 percent rate will apply, making it very difficult to separately identify the price and wealth effects. 6 We have also limited the sample to those over 30: as one might expect families headed by a person under 30 years of age show no responsiveness to the bequest price.
The estate tax also should affect charitable bequests. Joulfaian (2000) provides a table of existing results that we augment with the results in that article and reproduce here as Table 5 . Although the price elasticity estimates range from approximately zero to -4.0, many are in the range of -2.3 to -3.0. Not surprisingly, charitable bequests appear to be substantially more sensitive to the estate tax price than are charitable contributions made during life.
PROPOSED TAX CHANGES
Several recently proposed changes in tax law may affect the overall level of giving. Here we examine the effect on chari- The tax rates proposed by the President are listed in Table 6 and represent the fully phased-in rates (the phase-in occurs between 2002 and 2006) . To simulate the change in contributions, we use the permanent income and tax price elasticities from Table 4 . These elasticities and coefficients are applied to the 1997 SOI data, so that our simulation represents the total change in contributions had the schedule become fully effective in 1997. Further, because we use 1997 SOI data, this only represents the change in contributions from itemizers in 1997. Neither phaseouts nor the AMT are considered here. Instead, we use the statutory tax rates in the calculation of the change in giving from price and income effects.
Given these simplifications, the elasticities in Table 4 imply that had the proposed Source: Joulfaian (2000) rates been effective in 1997, contributions would have declined by about 2.5 percent. 8 Because our estimate does not consider the AMT or the phase-out of deductions, it should be taken as an upper bound on the possible change by itemizers rather than an unbiased estimate of the change that would have occurred. Bradley, Holden, and McClelland (2000) found that contributions to religious organizations are much less responsive to the tax price than contributions to social welfare organizations. If so then contributions to religious organizations may fall by less than contributions to social welfare organizations. If the proportion of contributions devoted to health and education increases with income, as Figure 2 suggests, then the large percent price increase among the highest income contributors may lead to sharper decreases in contributions to health and education nonprofit organizations.
The President also proposes allowing nonitemizers to deduct charitable contributions from taxable income. 9 As with contributions by taxpayers who itemize, deductions would be limited to 50 percent of AGI. The proposal is clearly intended to increase contributions: under it nonitemizers face a tax price of 1 -t.
Although seemingly straightforward, this proposal has several complications. First, if the standard deduction already takes into account average contributions, then nonitemizers will double-count these contributions under this proposed change. Further, one of the objectives of the standard deduction is to maintain a high level of tax compliance with a relatively low administrative burden. This proposal may increase record keeping requirements and the amount of noncompliance. Finally, there are a surprisingly large number of itemizers who would take the standard deduction were they allowed to deduct contributions as non-itemizers. For example, of the 36.6 million itemizers in 1997, 2.8 million would have benefitted from switching status under this proposal. Because their tax price would remain the same, these taxpayers would not be induced to contribute substantially more but their taxes would fall. For these taxpayers the proposal then represents more of a windfall than an incentive to contribute. This also implies that a price elasticity greater than one in absolute value no longer ensures treasury efficiency. 10 Price elasticities have been estimated in such studies as Duquette (1999) and Dunbar and Phillips (1990) , which draw from the same database but find different behavior for nonitemizers. Both use the 1985 and 1986 Individual Tax Model file in the Ernst & Young/ University of Michigan Tax Research Data Base. Both eliminate returns with negative or zero AGI and returns from prior years. In addition, Dunbar and Phillips delete returns using income averaging or with income not separately reported that induced special taxes (such as early pension distributions), while Duquette deletes returns subject to the AMT.
Since both articles used the Tobit method on apparently the same variables 8 If we use the elasticities representative of articles prior to 1989 (a price elasticity of -1.2 and an income elasticity of 0.8) contributions would have fallen by about three percent. 9 This proposal also includes increasing the corporate charitable deduction from 10 percent to 15 percent. We have not estimated the effect of this tax change on corporate contributions. 10 The distribution of recipients will probably not be affected: an examination of 1995 Giving and Volunteering data revealed that itemizers and nonitemizers contribute to similar charities. the difference in sample composition should be the source of any discrepancy in the estimates. These estimates, listed in Broman (1989) , finding a tax price elasticity of -3.36 and an income elasticity of 0.20. Using a logit model they examined the probability of making a contribution and found that the tax price substantially increased the probability of contributing. However, given the vast difference in results between Dunbar and Phillips and Duquette, it is difficult to interpret these results.
These vastly different elasticities also imply much different results for microsimulation modeling. For example, Cordes, O'Hare, and Steuerle (2000) analyzed a proposal similar to the President's using three different elasticity estimates, and found that had nonitemizers been allowed to deduct their contributions in 1995, total contributions would have increased by $2.3 billion, $5.5 billion, or $8.1 billion. Using the Giving USA estimate of $95 billion dollars of individual contributions, these represent 2.4 to 8.5 percent increases in contributions.
In another study for Independent Sector, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001) The proposed repeal of the estate tax would also affect contributions. Because of the difficulty in separating the price and wealth effects for families with net worth above $4.2 million, we create two simulations of the change in contributions from the repeal of the estate tax. In the first, the tax price elasticity for lower wealth families in Table 4 is imputed to high wealth families. In this case, we estimate that had the repeal been in effect in 1997 then contributions would have declined by about 6.5 percent. This estimate may be too low because it is believed that high-income families-which tend to be high wealthfamilies-are the most sensitive to tax prices.
On the other hand, very high-wealth families may have specific amounts they wish to bequeath to their heirs and give away the remainder. If so, then their contributions will be entirely unresponsive to the tax price. If we assume that the tax price elasticity for all high wealth households is zero then our estimates imply that total contributions would be roughly the same, although the distribution of recipients will change as lower wealth households reduce contributions and higher wealth households increase contributions.
In either case if individual contributions in life followed the pattern of charitable bequests in Figures 6 and 7 , contributions Duquette (1999) and Dunbar and Phillips (1990) to religious organizations would have declined. Contributions to education, health, and science may increase or decrease, depending upon the actual bequest price elasticity of those with taxable estates in excess of $4.2 million. Finally, Joulfaian (2000) estimates that eliminating the estate tax would reduce charitable bequests by about 12 percent. Although charitable bequests make up a small proportion of all giving, Figures 3  and 4 illustrate that educational and medical nonprofit institutions are likely to be more adversely affected than religious institutions. In addition, religious institutions receive only a small proportion of their funds from charitable bequests, so they will be relatively unaffected by a decrease in charitable bequests.
There is some disagreement over the effect of the estate tax on bequests. Schervish (2001) , for example, argues that repeal of the estate tax will actually increase charitable bequests. He makes two points. First, citing a study which estimates that real GDP would have increased by an additional 0.4 percent in the first year of repeal, he argues that repealing the estate tax will greatly increase wealth and ultimately charitable bequests. If the wealth of those making charitable bequests was permanently raised by this amount and we use a wealth elasticity of 1.4, then charitable bequests would have increased by 0.6 percent. However, this omits any price effect. If we assume that the average estate tax rate is 0.44, then estate tax repeal would decrease the tax price by 44 percent. If the bequest price elasticity is 2.5, the decrease due to the price effect would then be about 1.1 percent. Adding the wealth and price effects, we still find that charitable bequests would fall by about 0.5 percent.
The second argument comes from a survey conducted by Bankers Trust Private Banking in which 112 wealthy individuals were asked about the anticipated division of their estates (16 percent to charity, 47 percent to heirs, and 37 percent to taxes) and the one they actually desired (26 percent to charity, 64 percent to heirs, and 9 percent to taxes). From this difference Schervish concludes that elimination of the estate tax would increase charitable bequests.
Clearly there is a problem inherent in asking individuals to speculate about responses to proposed policy changes. On the other hand, an increase in charitable bequests from 16 to 26 percent (a 62 percent increase in giving) when net wealth increases from 63 percent to 91 percent (a 44 percent increase) is consistent with the Joulfaian (2000) wealth elasticity estimate of 1.4. In this sense the survey is consistent with existing estimates of wealth elasticities, if not price elasticities.
CONCLUSION
We estimate that individuals made $116 billion in charitable contributions in 1997 and at least $14 billion in charitable bequests. People donate to charity for many different reasons, and the federal government affects the aggregate level of giving in a variety of ways, including through the tax code. Recent proposals to reform tax policy by changing the rate structure, making contributions by non-itemizers deductible, and repealing the estate tax will all affect charitable donations by individuals.
President Bush has proposed altering the individual income tax rate structure. In a simple simulation in which the proposed schedule became fully effective in 1997, we find that contributions by itemizers would have declined by about 2.5 percent.
President Bush also proposes allowing nonitemizers to deduct charitable contributions from taxable income, phased in over a five year period. We estimate that 2.8 million of the 36.6 million itemizers in 1997 would have benefitted from switching itemization status under this proposal.
Because their tax price would remain the same, these taxpayers would not be induced to contribute substantially more but their taxes would fall. Possibly because of the wide range in estimated price elasticities by nonitemizers, micro-simulation models provide a wide range of possible effects. For example, the low estimate of Cordes, O'Hare, and Steurle (2000) is a 2.4 percent increase while the PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) estimate is more than 11 percent.
Repealing the estate tax would affect both charitable contributions and charitable bequests. Using coefficient estimates obtained from estimating a model using 1997 SCF data (similar to Greene and McClelland, 2001 ), a simulation of contributions had the repeal been in effect in 1997 finds that contributions would have decreased by about 6.5 percent. This assumed that very high-wealth families react to the tax incentives in the same manner as lower-wealth families. If we instead assume that these high-wealth familes are entirely unresponsive to the tax price then our simulations suggest that charitable contributions would remain roughly unchanged, although the distribution of recipients would change.
Finally, Joulfaian (2000) estimates that the elimination of the estate tax would reduce charitable bequests by about 12 percent. Schervish (2001) , on the other hand, argues that repealing the estate tax would actually increase charitable bequests. 
